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I. THE PROBLEM
HE Copyright Act of 1909 established a three-year statute of limi-
tations for criminal copyright infringement.' The 1909 Act did
not, however, include a statute of limitations on civil copyright in-
fringement actions.2 In 1958, after identifying a lack of uniformity and a
need to minimize forum shopping by litigants,3 Congress codified a three-
year statute of limitations on civil copyright infringement. 4 After courts
began to construe the new statute, it became apparent that the goals of
uniformity and decreased forum shopping had not been met.
The federal circuit courts have interpreted the statute of limitations as
analogous to a continuing tort; therefore, the courts restrict the relevant
procedural analysis to the three-year period that ends with the date upon
which a cause of action is filed. As long as an act of infringement oc-
curred within that three-year period, a plaintiff may maintain a cause of
action.5 Consequently, the first infringement need not occur within the
three-year period to maintain a cause of action; accrual of the cause of
action is not measured from the first infringing act.6 The first infringe-
ment's occurrence outside of the statutory period does not bar a cause of
action. One circuit, however, allows recovery for all damages, from the
first infraction onward, provided an infraction occurred within the statu-
tory period.7 Courts within the Second Circuit, among others, have re-
jected this approach.8
As a consequence of the various circuits' differing interpretations, the
goals of the 1958 amendment to the Copyright Act are in question. The
different interpretations prevent uniformity, and plaintiffs may now at-
tempt to bring suit in the Seventh Circuit, hoping to receive a larger re-
covery for more years of infringements. This comment reviews the
history of the Copyright Act and its statute of limitations, as well as court
interpretations of the statute. This comment also suggests a solution
1. Ch. 320, § 39, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (current version codified at 17 U.S.C. § 507(a)
(1988)). The original 1909 law provided "[tihat no criminal proceeding shall be maintained
under the provisions of this Act unless the same is commenced within three years after the
cause of action arose."
2. HERBERT A. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 166 (1952).
3. S. REP. No. 1014, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1961 [hereinafter Senate Report].
4. Act of Sept. 7, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-313, § 1, 71 Stat. 633 (1957). Originally found
at 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) (1970), Congress in 1976 re-codified the statute of limitations at 17
U.S.C. § 507(b) (1988). Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit. I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2586,
2586 (1976). This provision only applies to actions brought under federal copyright laws.
Other actions brought under state common law provisions are governed by the statutes of
limitations for each state, as was true before the original civil statute of limitations was
enacted in 1958. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 148 n.1 (1989).
5. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
6. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 148.
7. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
8. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 669 F. Supp. 583, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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designed to unify the statute of limitations in order to realize the prior
goals of uniformity and of minimal forum shopping.
II. HISTORY OF SECTION 507(B)
A. COPYRIGHT Acr OF 1909
The Copyright Act, enacted by Congress in 1909, set a three-year stat-
ute of limitations on criminal copyright infringement; however, the stat-
ute established no limitations period for civil infringement actions.9 In
civil infringement actions, federal courts continued to apply the statutes
of limitations of the state in which suit was filed. 10 Unfortunately, many
states did not have a statute of limitations for civil copyright infringe-
ment," so most of the courts in those states used the applicable limita-
tions on tort actions. 12 As a consequence, the terms of limitation varied
from state to state and ranged from one to six years, depending on the
jurisdiction.13
Deference to the assortment of state statutes of limitations led to sev-
eral nationwide problems. First, no uniformity existed in the application
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1988). One commentator notes that the original applica-
tion of this provision (before 1958, codified as 17 U.S.C. § 115) was primarily for the areas
of "willful infringement for profit and ... abuse of the copyright notice with fraudulent
intent, or knowingly issuing or selling or importing copies of any article bearing a false
notice of copyright." HOWELL, supra note 2, at 166.
10. ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 234 (1979); see, e.g., Brady v. Daly, 175
U.S. 148, 158 (1899) (Peckham, J.) (in absence of federal statute of limitations, limitations
period in state where action was brought should be applied); Pathe Exch., Inc. v. Dalke, 49
F.2d 161, 162 (4th Cir. 1931) (in absence of federal statute, applying Virginia statute of
limitations); McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., 299 F. 48 (5th Cir. 1924) (applying Louisiana
statute of limitations for civil copyright infringement, in absence of federal statute, for
production of play The Scarlet Letter). The use of state statutes of limitations was one of
the problems noted in the Senate Report which accompanied the enactment of § 115(b) in
1957. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1961.
11. See letter from L. Quincy Mumford, Librarian of Congress, to Hon. Emanuel Cel-
ler, Chairman Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 11, 1955), [hereinafter Mumford
Letter] reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1964.
12. HOWELL, supra note 2, at 166. While many district courts relied on state limita-
tions on actions in tort, others applied theories involving conversion, injuries to property or
personal rights, trover, and liabilities not under contract. Senate Report, supra note 3, at
1961.
13. HOWELL, supra note 2, at 166. One author has suggested that three states had
possible limitations periods of one year: Alabama, Arizona, and Louisiana. See, e.g., STAN-
LEY ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT LAW: BASIC AND RELATED MATERIALS 652-55 (1956).
Other states, such as New York and Massachusetts, applied a six-year limitations period.
Id. The source of such differing local variations was the application of divergent theories
for limitation. For example, states such as Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Ver-
mont apply a limitations period based upon tort causes of action (with resulting three-,
one-, six- and six-year limitations periods, respectively), while states such as Arizona, New
York, and Ohio apply a "statutory liability" theory to create a limitations period (with
respective one, six, and six-year limitations periods). Id. To further compound the prob-
lem, states like North Carolina use multiple theories to create varying limitations periods,
such as a two-year period (based upon a "statutory liability" theory), as well as a three-
year period (for actions that injure the rights of another). Id. In such a state, not only does
forum shopping become a consideration, but a plaintiff could plead the same cause of ac-
tion under either of two theories to take advantage of the inconsistent limitations periods.
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of these state statutes.14 Additionally, national jurisprudence was incon-
sistent because of the divergent theories adopted in determining a local
statute of limitations. 15 Finally, the range of time limits led to widespread
forum shopping by litigants.' 6 For example, a plaintiff whose copyright
was infringed in both California and New York could bring suit in New
York for either one or three years, (depending upon which of two limita-
tions theories was applied in New York), after the two-year limitations
period expired in California.' 7 These three problems were identified by
Congress during the 1957 push to amend the Copyright Act.
B. 1957 AMENDMENT
To solve the problems of lack of uniformity, diversity of theories, and
forum shopping by litigants, Congress amended the Copyright Act of
1909 to provide a three-year limitations period for civil copyright in-
fringement under the Copyright Act.' 8 Congress established the statute
to match the Act's limitations period for criminal copyright infringe-
ment. 19 Congress not only intended the statutory limitations period to be
uniform throughout the states, but also to be uniform for both criminal
and civil infringement under the Copyright Act.20
Despite displacing numerous state interpretations of limitations peri-
ods for civil copyright infringement, the new statute did retain many ele-
ments of the common law. Perhaps most importantly, the courts
continued to treat infringement as a continuing tort, so plaintiffs only
needed to demonstrate that an infringement had occurred within the stat-
utory limitations period to retain their right to recover; the original in-
fringement did not need to occur within the three-year time period before
the suit was filed.21 The new statute also retained equitable tolling doc-
trines such as the legal disability of an injured party and the absence of a
14. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1962.
15. The interpretation of the Copyright Act, a federal statute, by state courts on diver-
gent state law principles, made limitations a particularly troubling area of copyright law.
16. LATMAN, supra note 10, at 234. The Senate Report cited forum shopping as one of
the principle reasons for enacting a statute of limitations for civil copyright infringement.
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1962.
17. See, e.g., ROTHENBERO, supra note 13, at 653.
18. § 507(b).
19. § 507(a). During debate, the Senate noted that there was no "substantial reason"
for not having matching limitations periods for criminal and civil infringement, since prose-
cutions under the criminal provisions were "extremely rare." Senate Report, supra note 3,
at 1962.
20. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1962.
21. See Baxter v. Curtis Indus., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1962). The
Baxter court noted that the new statute did not change the nature of infringement as a
continuous tort, so the period of limitations began to run from the last, rather than the
first, infringing act. IL In reaching this decision, the court relied on Cain v. Universal
Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942), which was decided before Congress en-
acted the federal statute of limitations. The Baxter court also examined the 1957 amend-
ment's legislative history, which stated "The [C]ommittee wishe[d] to emphasize that it is
the [C]ommittee's intention that the statute of limitations contained in [the] bill, is to ex-
tend to the remedy of the person effected thereby, and not to his substantive rights." Bax-
ter, 201 F. Supp. at 101 (quoting Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1963).
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defendant from the United States. 22 Finally, the Senate Report suggests
that Congress intended to retain any local equitable tolling considerations
that applied to the particular state statutes of limitations. 23
C. 1976 RECODIFICATION
In 1976, Congress recodified Section 115(b) at 17 U.S.C. § 507(b).24
Congress retained the three-year limitations period, and the application
of the Copyright Act's infringement provisions became an area of exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction.25 However, state statutes of limitations continue
to control state law actions for civil copyright infringement under the
common law.2 6
III. COURT CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
A. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIMITATIONS
Statutes of limitations have served numerous purposes throughout his-
tory. In fact, Justice White noted that limitations "are found and ap-
proved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. '27 The British
common law recognized limitation periods as early as 1540.28 Despite the
existence of statutes of limitations in other systems of jurisprudence, or
22. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1962. The Senate discussed whether the concept of
fraudulent concealment should be retained within the statute, but rejected such a provi-
sion, stating, "the nature of copyright protection and present practices in the publishing
industry reduced [the possibility of fraudulent concealment] to a minimum." Id. The Sen-
ate also rejected a proposal to specifically enumerate the allowed tolling considerations in
the statute. See Mumford Letter, supra note 11, at 1964.
23. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1963. Despite this suggestion, courts have rejected
the use of local equities, although they have retained the one tolling doctrine that Congress
specifically rejected, fraudulent concealment. See Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446
F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he drafters could not have intended that each court apply
those equitable considerations peculiar to its locality since to do so would completely de-
stroy the announced Congressional purpose of providing a [uniform] federal statute of
limitations."). The Neva court additionally held that since fraudulent concealment is rec-
ognized in every federal jurisdiction, it could operate to toll the statute of limitations with-
out disrupting the purpose of uniformity. Id. at 340-41.
24. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05, at 12-101 n.2 (1994).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
26. See GoLsTIN, supra note 4, at 148; see also Mention v. Gessell, 714 F.2d 87, 89
(9th Cir. 1983) (in common law action for civil copyright infringement, Oregon's two-year
period controlled since Oregon was the copyright owner's domicile); Avco Corp. v. Preci-
sion Air Parts, Inc., 676 F.2d 494,496 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982) (apply-
ing Alabama's one-year residual limitations period in absence of contract action or specific
statutory period for civil copyright infringement).
27. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (White, J.) (quoting Wood v.
Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)). Justice White suggested "that it is unjust to fail to
put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that 'the right
to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.'"
Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (quoting Railroad Tel. v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,
349 (1944) (Jackson, J.)).
28. See The Act of Limitation with a Proviso, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (Eng.). The act
provides as follows:
Forasmuch as the Time of Limitation appointed for suing.., extend, and be
of so far and long Time past, that it is above the Remembrance of any living
Man, truly to try and know the perfect Certainty of such Things, as hath or
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the justifications for those limitations, American jurisprudence commonly
recognizes three justifications for statutes of limitations.
The first justification is that of repose for society.29 This repose is often
interpreted to justify a focus on both society and individual parties to
lawsuits. From a societal perspective, repose means that the courts are in
no danger of being overburdened with old claims. The Supreme Court
noted that "courts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale
claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights."' 30 From an individual per-
spective, defendants should have a point at which they no longer fear
reprisal for past actions. 3' Such a point would allow potential defendants
to engage in business without the fear of loss as a result of actions or
behaviors. Thus, statutes of limitations provide repose for defendants as
well as society.
The second common justification is that of protecting against parties
losing the ability to present a case in court. This primarily protects de-
fendants. 32 The statutes attempt to guard against the loss of evidence, 33
faded memories, 34 and the disappearance of witnesses. 35 The Supreme
Court justified this approach on the grounds that eventually the right to
be protected from stale claims prevails over the right to prosecute those
claims. 36
The third justification for statutes of limitations deals with the weighing
of the relative equities between the respective parties. As noted, the de-
fendant's right to be protected from stale claims eventually takes prece-
dence over the plaintiff's right to recovery. This is justified by the belief
that, generally, the plaintiff is responsible for sacrificing his or her
claim.37 Thus, the first two justifications, repose and loss of defense, are
shall come in Trial... to the great Danger of Mens Consciences that have or
shall be impanelled in any Jury for the Trial of the same.
(quoted in Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 n.4 (1965) (Goldberg, J.)).
29. See, e.g., Public Sch. v. Walker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 282, 288 (1869). The Court sug-
gested that plaintiffs who voluntarily sleep on their rights cannot later disturb society
through the assertion of those rights. Id.
30. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428.
31. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119.
32. See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963). The court noted that the primary purpose of statutes of
limitations is to protect the interests of potential defendants, both from a loss of their
defense and from fear of litigation (repose). Id. This is the substantive right inherent
within statutes of limitations. Id. As a general proposition, the Court intended to protect
against surprise to the defendant through the revival of past claims. Burnett, 380 U.S. at
428.
33. Id. at 428 (citing Railroad TeL, 321 U.S. at 348-49).
34. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428; Railroad Tel., 321 U.S. at 348-49.
35. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428; Railroad TeL, 321 U.S. at 348-49.
36. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428. This language was echoed in United States v. Kubrick, in
which the Court held that concerns for repose and loss of evidence justified outweighing
the plaintiff's rights with concerns for the defendant, provided adequate time had passed
for the plaintiff to prosecute a claim. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117.
37. See, e.g., Walker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 288. The Court noted that legislators gener-
ally declare that the plaintiff, "having voluntarily slept so long upon his rights," cannot then
assert those same ignored rights to recover for a wrong committed by the defendant. Id.
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based upon the third justification, which is the equity inherent in denying
recovery to a plaintiff because of that plaintiff's delay.
B. TOLLING DoCrRINES
Because statutes of limitations weigh the competing claims of plaintiffs
and defendants, they provide a means for balancing the rights and equi-
ties between the two parties. Once it is acknowledged that defendants
have rights granted by a statute of limitations, the statute is not viewed as
purely punitive or harsh, which aids in justifying its enforcement. The
Supreme Court noted that statutory periods "are established to cut off
rights, justifiable or not, that might otherwise be asserted, and they must
be strictly adhered to by the judiciary. ' 38 The Seventh Circuit echoed
this language when it held that "[s]tatutes of limitations are not arbitrary
obstacles to the vindication of just claims, and therefore they should not
be given a grudging application.
' '39
Although statutes of limitations balance the rights of the plaintiff and
defendant, as well as protect societal interests, the claims can only be
balanced when they are on equal ground. In some instances, plaintiffs do
not become aware that they have a right to recovery until the statutory
period has already expired. In those cases, courts toll the statute of limi-
tations for reasons of equity.40 Equitable concerns arise, for example,
when the plaintiff is unable to assert a right because of war or the defend-
ant's absence from the country.41 The equitable tolling doctrines are
grudgingly applied.
42
38. Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947). In Kavanagh, the Court considered
the claim of a taxpayer against the Internal Revenue Service for recovery of the taxpayer's
overpayment. The taxpayer paid a deficiency asserted by the Service based upon a Treas-
ury regulation. When the particular regulation was later declared invalid, the taxpayer
attempted to recover his deficiency payment. Although acknowledging the virtue of his
claim, the Court denied the recovery, because the statutory period had already run against
the taxpayer's claim. Id. at 538-39. The Court also noted that when Congress creates a
remedy, such as recovery against the Service (or perhaps a civil infringement suit under the
Copyright Act), a congressionally established period for recovery, after which recovery is
denied, must be given great deference. Id. at 539. The Court stated that the only equities
to be realized in such a situation were those created by Congress rather than the courts.
Id.
39. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1261 (1991). The court based its reasoning in this age discrimination
case upon the protection of "social interests in certainty, accuracy, and repose." Id. at 453.
Importantly, this is the same court (and same judge authoring the opinion) that extended
the statute of limitations in an action for copyright infringement. See Taylor, 712 F.2d at
1118-19.
40. See Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428.
41. Id. These are examples of equitable tolling, which depend upon neither party be-
ing responsible for the plaintiff's inability to bring a cause of action due to the limitations
period's expiration. In contrast, equitable estoppel doctrines apply when the defendant is
responsible for the plaintiff's inability to assert a right to recovery, possibly because the
defendant fraudulently concealed the plaintiff's cause of action. Prather v. Neva Paper-
backs, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir. 1971).
42. Cada, 920 F.2d at 453. Judge Posner argued that "promiscuous application of toll-
ing doctrines" would "trivialize the statute of limitations." Id. Since both parties are inno-
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IV. COURT CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT
A. IN GENERAL
Consistent with Congress's intent, courts began the interpretation of
the statute of limitations for civil copyright infringement recognizing the
statute's goal of national uniformity. 43 The courts have retained equita-
ble considerations, particularly one specifically rejected by Congress,
fraudulent concealment. 44 Courts have, however, rejected tolling doc-
trines which exist only in local law.45
The courts also continue to view civil copyright infringement as a con-
tinuing tort, which requires only that the last infringing act be within the
statutory period.46 The limitations period does not begin to run from the
first infringing act.47 If the first infringing act occurred more than three
years before the suit was filed, the claim is not barred unless no infringing
act occurred within the statutory period.48
Despite being allowed to recover for acts of infringement even though
the first act is outside the statutory period, a plaintiff generally may only
recover for damages and infringements that occur within the statutory
period.49 The same is true for defendants asserting counterclaims for
copyright infringement; the first act of infringement may be outside of the
three-year period, but the plaintiff only recovers for acts that occur within
the three years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 50 Courts generally allow
recovery for acts of infringement beginning outside of the statutory pe-
cent, the negligence of the party seeking equitable tolling can "tip the balance" against that
party. Id.
43. Prather, 446 F.2d at 339. In this case, the court referred to the drafting history and
congressional reports that accompanied the statute, and noted that its purpose was to end
the problems of diverse application and forum shopping. Id.
44. Id. at 340. The court held that because the goal was uniformity, the only applica-
ble tolling doctrines were those recognized in all federal forums. Id. Fraudulent conceal-
ment was one such doctrine, and it has two elements: (1) the successful concealment of a
cause of action by a defendant, and (2) fraudulent means to achieve the concealment. Id.
at 341. Despite Congress specifically rejecting fraudulent concealment as an equitable con-
sideration in tolling the statute of limitations, the court applied it because of its universal
recognition. i; Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1962.
45. Id. at 340-41. The court rejected application of Florida's "Blameless Ignorance"
rule, since the rule was a peculiarly local doctrine. Id. at 340.
46. See discussion supra note 21.
47. See Baxter, 201 F. Supp. at 101.
48. Prather v. Camerarts Publishing Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. 68 (N.D. Il. 1972).
49. Id.
50. See Eisenman Chem. Co. v. NL Indus., 595 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.C. Nev. 1984). In
Eisenman, the defendant brought a counterclaim regarding infringements which began in
January 1979, outside the three-year period, but ended in June 1980, within the three-year
period. In holding the counterclaim was not time-barred, the Eisenman court relied on
Taylor. The Eisenman decision, however, misinterpreted Taylor when it stated "[blecause
legal proceedings must be commenced within three years of the last unlawful act, the litiga-
tion is not really concerned with claims relating to the distant past." Id. The Taylor court
would be concerned with claims relating to the distant past.
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riod, but not for those acts that occurred entirely outside of the statutory
period.
Limiting damages to recovery only for infringements occurring within
the statutory period is consistent with the language of the statute, as well
as the stated drafters' intent. The original statute limited recovery to
three years.51 Thus, recovery could only be had, according to judicial in-
terpretation, for acts occurring within the three years preceding the filing
of a lawsuit.5 2 Although the interpretation of copyright infringement as a
continuing tort was allowed, recovery could not be had for the first in-
fringing acts.
B. CONFLIcTING INTERPRETATION
In 1983, the Seventh Circuit took a view regarding the application of
the statute of limitations contrary to that of the other circuits. In Taylor
v. Meirick the court held that recovery should be allowed for all acts,
including those outside the statutory limitations period, provided an act
of infringement occurred within the statutory period.53 The court held
that allowing recovery for all infringing acts was consistent with the goals
of the statute of limitations. 54 The court also noted that alternative justi-
fications for its final decision existed, such as the occurrence of fraudulent
concealment by the defendant, which would have tolled the running of
the statutory limitations period.55
The approach advocated by the Seventh Circuit has been rejected by
courts within the Second Circuit. Some courts, when asked to adopt the
approach in Taylor, as opposed to the Second Circuit standard estab-
lished in Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club,56 have rejected the Taylor
approach as advocated by Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit.57 These
courts have held that the Seventh Circuit approach serves neither the in-
terests espoused within the statute of limitations, nor the purposes advo-
51. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1988) (formerly 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) (1970)).
52. See Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1977). In
Mount the court noted that most of the manufacture, promotion, and sales of the infringed
work occurred more than three years before the plaintiff filed a complaint. Only 116 previ-
ously unsold copies were sold during the three-year period before the plaintiff filed a com-
plaint. As a consequence, the plaintiff was only allowed recovery for infringements which
occurred within the three years before the lawsuit was filed, which entitled plaintiff to a
recovery of $551. Id.
53. 712 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983).
54. Id.; see discussion infra part V.A.
55. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119.
56. 555 F.2d at 1111.
57. See, e.g., Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11, 11 (6th Cir. 1981); Gaste v.
Kaiserman, 669 F. Supp. 583,584 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Gaste, plaintiffs alleged that the song
"Feelings" infringed on their copyright in the song "Pour Toi." The court granted partial
summary judgment on behalf of the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs could only re-
cover for infringements occurring after July 21, 1983, which was the date three years before
the lawsuit was filed. Gaste, 669 F. Supp. at 583-84. The Sixth Circuit, in Hoste, agreed
that any particular infringements which accrued three years before suit was filed were
time-barred, thus preventing recovery by the plaintiff. Hoste, 654 F.2d at 11.
1995]
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cated by Congress in enacting the statute of limitations for the Copyright
Act.58
1. Seventh Circuit Approach
The plaintiff in Taylor copyrighted maps of Illinois lakes for use by fish-
ermen.59 Defendant copied the maps without authorization in 1976 and
1977. The plaintiff filed suit in 1980, after the three-year statutory period
apparently expired on the 1976 infringements. The defendant, however,
took no action to end the sale of his maps by retailers. The court rejected
his defense of limitations, holding him responsible for the retailers' later
infringements.60 The court also noted that unsubstantiated evidence of-
fered by the plaintiff suggested that the defendant continued to infringe
plaintiff's copyright after 1977. Finally, the court found that the plaintiff
was unaware of the infringement until 1979, which would have tolled the
running of the statute until 1979.61
After stating that the defendant's fraudulent concealment tolled the
statute of limitations and implicated defendant in the sale of maps that
took place after 1977, the court addressed the question of whether the
plaintiff could complain of sales which took place three years before he
filed suit. After supporting the treatment of copyright infringement as a
continuing tort,62 the court stated that allowing recovery for acts of in-
fringement occurring before 1977 was consistent with the purposes of the
statute of limitations. 63 The court argued that the first act of copying was
the first step in the continuing wrong, and thus recovery should be al-
lowed for that first infringement. 64 Alternatively, the court stated the
58. Gaste, 669 F. Supp. at 584; see also Kregos v. AP, Sports Features Syndicate, 795 F.
Supp. 1325, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In Kregos, the court rejected the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach to limitations, holding "[wie follow the course set by the Second Circuit which gives
full effect to 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)'s limitations allowing recovery only for those damages
which accrued within the three-year period immediately preceding the commencement of
suit." Id.
59. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1117.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court indicated that by putting his own copyright on the maps taken from
Taylor, Meirick fraudulently concealed the infringement from both the plaintiff and poten-
tial purchasers. Id. at 1118.
62. Id. The court entered this opinion in reliance on Baxter, 201 F. Supp. at 101, and
Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 1942). In Cain, the de-
fendant incorporated part of plaintiff's work into a motion picture script, which was later
made into a movie. Id. The court found this infringement to be a continuing action, since
the goal of writing the script was the creation of a movie. Id. The defendant, therefore,
was responsible not only for the original infringement, but was also responsible for the
movie's later release, which defeated his defense of limitations. Id.
63. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119. The court suggested that two purposes existed for the
statute of limitations: (1) an evidentiary purpose, or the protection against the loss of
evidence, and (2) repose, which is an assurance over time that a person will not be sued for
past deeds. Id. The court dismissed the evidentiary function, claiming "[s]ome of the evi-
dence, at least, will be fresh." Id. at 1119. The defendant's uncertainty regarding suit,
which is protected under repose, would be "confined to the statutory period. His uncer-
tainty about the extent of his liability may be greater, but that is often true in litigation."
Id; see also discussion infra part V.A.
64. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119.
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tolling doctrines would allow recovery.65 The court allowed Taylor to re-
cover for all acts of infringement after 1976, the date of the first infringe-
ment, rather than for the three years preceding the filing of suit in 1980,
as prescribed by the statute.66
2. Rejection of Taylor
When faced with similar facts, a court within the Second Circuit re-
jected the approach invented by Judge Posner. In Gaste v. Kaiserman the
district court held that the statute must be strictly construed.67 The court,
in arguing for policies which supported the statute of limitations, adopted
policies of repose and evidentiary purposes consistent with prior Second
Circuit rulings.68 The court ruled that a plaintiff could only "recover[ ]
... those monetary damages within the three-year period... immediately
preceding the ... lawsuit" 69 and not "any monetary damages which pre-
date the commencement of the copyright action by more than three
years." 70
3. Conflict
Since the original purposes behind the amendment of the Copyright
Act which created the statute of limitations were uniformity among the
states and minimized forum shopping, court decisions should advance
and reinforce these goals. However, the split between the circuits upsets
these goals. The circuits' jurisprudence is not uniform; moreover, the
source of the conflict is inconsistent interpretation of the only statute that
applies. The original variations were based on diverse theories being ap-
plied to diverse statutes, while the current conflict is caused by divergent
theories applied to the same statute. As a result, plaintiffs may engage in
forum shopping and attempt to bring suit in the Seventh Circuit, which
allows plaintiffs to recover for more years of infringement.
One court has taken this difference between the circuits into account in
the consideration of requests for injunction, as provided for in the Copy-
right Act.71 In MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc.72 the Tenth Circuit
65. Id
66. Id. The alternative, recommended reading would have allowed recovery only on
infringements beginning in 1977.
67. 669 F. Supp. 583, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The court stated that to follow the Seventh
Circuit's approach would "render the words of the Copyright Act meaningless and eradi-
cate the policy objectives of... limitations period[s]." Id.
68. Id at 584. The court relied on Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, 555 F.2d at
1111, in adopting the purposes of a statute of limitations. Id See supra note 52 for discus-
sion of Mount.
69. Gaste, 669 F. Supp. at 584.
70. Id
71. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994).
72. 962 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1992). In MAI, the plaintiffs filed suit against former em-
ployees of MAI for alleged copyright infringements. The defendants in turn requested an
injunction, which was granted, preventing MAI from threatening defendants' distributors
and resellers with litigation if they continued to market the defendants' software. On ap-
peal, the court reversed the trial court's injunction. Id. at 980.
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pointed to the split between the Second and Sixth Circuits on one side,
and the Seventh Circuit on the other, as grounds for reversing the grant
of an injunction to the plaintiff in an infringement action.73 Thus, the
existence of the circuit split not only allows forum shopping, but has
alarmed one court with the possibility of the waiver of interstate rights. 74
The concerns have thus flowed from the realm of legal remedies to con-
cerns regarding actions in equity.
V. SOLUTIONS & PROPOSALS
A. GRANT OF CERTIORARI BY THE SUPREME COURT
The simplest solution is for the Supreme Court to review the decisions
of the lower courts. Certainly, a ruling on whether plaintiffs are entitled
to recover for actions outside the statutory limitations period would end
the conflict between the circuits. Because several circuits have yet to take
a stand on the issue, however, the Court may be hesitant to grant certio-
rari.75 Nonetheless, the Taylor decision is ten years old, and not all cir-
cuits have frequent copyright lawsuits. The Second and Seventh Circuits
(in which New York and Chicago are located) have large copyright dock-
ets, and both circuits have ruled on the issue. 76 However, these courts are
also split in their interpretations of the statute.77
If the Court were to grant certiorari, it would need to favor one theory
or the other because little middle ground exists between the two common
interpretations of the statute. The preferable interpretation is that of the
Second Circuit, which strictly interprets the statute. This is due to the
73. Id. at 987 n.9. The court stated that "the substantial risk of claims of MAI being
barred may not be disregarded. This is an added factor pointing to the inadvisability of the
broad injunction granted." Id.
74. Id. at 986. The court seemed to place blame for the status quo interpretive difficul-
ties on the fact that the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari on the matter. Also,
several of the federal circuits have yet to rule on the issue. As a consequence, the court
was uncomfortable with the potential waiver of MAI's claims. Id. at 987 n.9.
75. While this theory explaining the Supreme Court's hesitancy remains speculative,
an increasing number of courts are aligning themselves against the Seventh Circuit. The
Fifth Circuit rejected Taylor's continuing tort theory in Makedwde Publishing Co. v. John-
son, 37 F.3d 180, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1994). In Makedwde, the court opined that the Taylor
court applied an overly broad definition of infringement, which the Fifth Circuit refused to
follow. Id. at 182. Similarly, in Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th
Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected Taylor's interpretation of § 507(b).
76. The leading Second Circuit case, Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, 555 F.2d 1108(2d Cir. 1977) was decided approximately six years before the leading Seventh Circuit case,
Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983).
77. The Taylor court distinguished Mount in its decision. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1117.
Judge Posner wrote that "[a] tortfeasor has a duty to assist his victim." Id. Meirick, the
defendant in Taylor, had taken no steps to assist Taylor in preventing future infringements
by Meirick's retailers after Meirick infringed on Taylor's copyright. The Seventh Circuit
treated this failure as a new tort which extended the statute of limitations. Id. Posner
contended that if Meirick had taken reasonable actions to recover the infringing maps
before they were sold to consumers, the suit would be time-barred. Id. This analysis, how-
ever, ignores the evidentiary and repose functions of the statute of limitations. Addition-
ally, in Mount, defendants did continue to sell infringing materials within the statutory
period, which is more than Meirick did in the Seventh Circuit case, and the court held that
the action was time-barred. Mount, 555 F.2d at 1111.
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premise advanced by Judge Posner (the author of the Taylor opinion),
that statutes of limitations should be strictly enforced. 78
One justification for statutes of limitations generally discussed by Pos-
ner is the concept of repose. Posner argued that repose would exist as to
whether the defendant would be sued or not, since an action must occur
within the statutory period.79 Thus, the only uncertainty would regard
the extent of the defendant's possible liability.80 This argument ignores
the purpose behind repose. Defendants at some point should no longer
fear being sued for past actions. The Seventh Circuit approach does al-
low liability to increase, but only because recovery is allowed for past
actions. As Posner noted in his opinion, "it is more painful to lose what
you have come to think of as your own than it is gratifying to get back
something you wrote off many years ago and have grown accustomed to
doing without."' 81 Unfortunately, the opinion in Taylor ignores the realis-
tic effects of the holding in light of this observation.
A second concern is the loss of evidence. The Seventh Circuit suggests
that the statute of limitations is designed to reduce the error rate in litiga-
tion.82 As a consequence of this interpretation of the evidentiary func-
tion of limitations, Posner states that "[s]ome of the evidence, at least,
will be fresh."'83 The court believed that enough evidence would likely
exist from current infringements to provide evidence of older infringe-
ments.84 This argument ignores, however, two presumptions: first, the
presumption, stated by Posner, that limitations should not be hesitatingly
78. Cada, 920 F.2d at 452.
79. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119.
80. Id Judge Posner suggested that the concern over liability is often present in
litigation.
81. Id. at 1119. Posner relied onr Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 477 (1897), in justifying the notion of repose. The central theme therein is that
defendants, once they have accumulated something and are outside of the statutory period,
are more negatively affected by the loss of that property than plaintiffs are benefitted by
the return of the property. Id. Holmes claims:
[a] thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time,
whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn
away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however
you came by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deeper in-
stincts of man.
Id Without delving into the equities of returning lost goods or property to the plaintiff,
the significance of this statement seems self-evident. The Seventh Circuit, however, ig-
nores the fact that losing property through increased liability has the same practical effect
as completely disallowing defendants to assert the defense of statute of limitations when no
action has occurred within the statutory period.
82. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119.
83. Id.
84. Id Importantly, the Taylor court dealt with four-year-old infringements, so the
court only extended the statutory period by one year. Id. One is left to wonder whether
the court would follow the same standard of considering some of the evidence fresh if the
infringements in question occurred ten or twenty years before suit was filed, as was the
case in Mount. Mount, 555 F.2d at 1109. Rather than stating the principle of extending the
statute of limitations as akin to an equitable tolling doctrine, and thus within the discretion
of the court, the Seventh Circuit established the extension of the statute of limitations as a
rule, which seemingly allows any plaintiff to reach back outside of the statutory period.
Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1118-19.
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applied; and, second, that limitations operate to protect the defendant.8 5
If limitations are not to be hesitatingly applied, then they should be
strictly enforced unless a tolling doctrine is present. Also, to protect the
defendant, the limitations period, no matter how operationally arbitrary,
must be strictly enforced. Thus, the arguments regarding repose most
strongly favor a strict construction of the statute of limitations.
Finally, the copyright statute of limitations does retain many common
law equitable tolling doctrines. Plaintiffs are not without recourse in in-
stances of fraudulent concealment or war. In Taylor, facts supporting
fraudulent concealment were present; thus, the same result could have
occurred without reaching into the realm of the statute of limitations.
Equity, therefore, can be served despite a strict construction of the stat-
ute of limitations. The court has gained nothing at the expense of the
repose and evidentiary functions of the statute of limitations.
B. VIEW TA YLOR AS AN EQUITABLE TOLLING CASE
1. Fraudulent Concealment
As noted, the Taylor court highlighted facts that supported a finding
that the defendant fraudulently concealed Taylor's cause of action from
him.86 Meirick, the defendant, placed his copyright on Taylor's map.
When Taylor brought the infringement to Meirick's attention, Meirick
agreed to stop publication of the maps but did not do so. According to
the court, these actions met the two elements for fraudulent concealment,
in that the actions successfully concealed the cause of action and the de-
fendant had intent to conceal the cause of action.87
The Fifth Circuit noted in Prather v. Neva Paperbacks that the doctrine
of fraudulent concealment is recognized throughout the federal circuits. 88
Despite the Senate's rejection of fraudulent concealment as unnecessary
given modem realities, those same realities have justified the application
of fraudulent concealment. The facts in both Neva and Taylor suggested
the need for fraudulent concealment. The courts have shown an inclina-
tion to apply the doctrine, and universal application would be consistent
with the congressional goal of uniformity. Additionally, testimony to the
Senate recommended the adoption of fraudulent concealment as an equi-
table principle.89 Most importantly, the application of fraudulent con-
85. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d at 559.
86. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119. The two elements of fraudulent concealment are success-
ful concealment and intent to conceal the cause of action. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, 446
F.2d at 340.
87. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119.
88. Prather, 446 F.2d at 340-41. The court noted that fraudulent concealment is a well-
settled principle of both common law and federal law. Id.
89. The copyright committee of the Bar Association of New York City recommended
the codification of the fraudulent concealment doctrine within the newly adopted statute of
limitations. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1965. The committee on copyright law
revision of the American Bar Association, however, considered it "unnecessary or unwise"
to include the fraudulent concealment provision. Id.
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cealment would circumvent the need for inconsistent application of the
statute of limitations.
2. Discovery Rule
The Taylor court also acknowledged the possible application of the dis-
covery rule.9° The discovery rule tolls the running of the limitations pe-
riod until the plaintiff is aware or a reasonable person should have
become aware of the cause of action.91 The Taylor court noted that the
plaintiff was unaware of the existence of his cause of action, and could
not have been expected to be aware of the action.92 Application of the
discovery rule also avoids misconstruction of the statute of limitations.
Either of the equitable tolling views are consistent with a goal Judge
Posner frequently advances: the role of economics in jurisprudence. 93
One author contends that the remedy provided by Judge Posner, which
allowed copyright owners to recover the infringer's profits from the in-
fringement, even though these profits exceeded the losses actually suf-
fered through the infringement, was intended to economically discourage
infringements.94 Additionally, the excess encourages infringers to negoti-
ate with copyright owners rather than steal copyrights or work within the
"bypass market. ' 95 This approach is an example of employing the law of
restitution.96 By extending the period of time for which a copyright
owner can recover, the Seventh Circuit has created a strong disincentive
to infringe on copyrights.
If the Seventh Circuit's primary goal is the creation of restitutionary
disincentives, then equitable tolling principles such as the discovery rule
and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment increase the recovery allowed
against an infringer, which in turn strengthens the disincentive to infringe
on copyrights. This justification focuses on the remedy allowed by the
court. To extend the time for recovery based upon the Seventh Circuit's
reading of Section 507(b) affects the substantive right allowed, in that the
extension of the statute of limitations affects the time for which recovery
can be had without equitable considerations. Alternatively, equitable
tolling and fraudulent concealment affect the remedy available to a copy-
right owner, without changing the structure of the underlying substantive
law. Judge Posner's economic theory should affect only the remedy al-
lowed to a copyright owner, as indicated by Congress.97 Also, the option
90. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorney's Fees in Class Actions, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 656, 707 n.241 (1991).
94. Id.; see also Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1119-22.
95. Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1120.
96. Id.
97. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 1963; see also supra note 22.
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exercised by the Seventh Circuit violates the rule of deference to Con-
gress established in Kavanagh.98
C. ADVISABILITY OF PROPOSALS
The stated goals of the statute of limitations were to provide a uniform
limitations period and to minimize forum shopping; thus, each proposal
must be judged with respect to these two criteria. Adoption by the
Supreme Court of the Second Circuit's interpretation of the statute of
limitations would provide uniformity, in that all circuits would be bound
to allow recovery only for those infringements which occur within three
years before a lawsuit is filed. Additionally, litigants would have one less
reason to search for a favorable forum, since all forums would apply the
law similarly. Importantly, this solution requires Supreme Court review,
since the federal circuits are already split.
The second option is to view Taylor as an equitable doctrines case. The
Seventh Circuit acknowledged the presence of both fraudulent conceal-
ment and the possible tolling of the statute of limitations under the dis-
covery rule. If Taylor were viewed as an equitable tolling case, with the
holding regarding the construction of the statute of limitations as dicta,
then the Second Circuit interpretation could be uniformly adopted. This
view would also lead to decreased forum shopping. Unfortunately, courts
frequently cite the Taylor decision as one of two methods for calculating
the time period for the statute of limitations.99 The Supreme Court
should grant certiorari to correct this flaw.
A third option is for the Supreme Court to adopt the Seventh Circuit
opinion articulated in Taylor. When compared to the opinions in Mount
v. Book-of-the-Month Club'00 and Gaste,101 the Seventh Circuit could
provide uniformity and minimize forum shopping. In addition, the Sec-
ond Circuit application maintains the integrity of the statutes of limita-
tions.10 2 The Second Circuit approach provides repose and protects
against the loss of evidence. The Seventh Circuit approach does not ade-
quately meet these functions. Thus, the Second Circuit jurisprudence is
preferable to that of the Seventh Circuit.
98. Kavanagh, 332 U.S. at 539. While creating an economic disincentive for copyright
infringers may be warranted, the Seventh Circuit had two options. One means of creating
a disincentive is through the application of the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment.
Rather than apply these equitable doctrines, the Seventh Circuit broke the rule of defer-
ence to Congress stated in Kavanagh, and the court avoided the Congressional intent be-
hind § 507(b).
99. See, e.g., Kahn v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 970 F.2d 1030, 1040 (2d Cir.
1992); MAI, 962 F.2d at 987.
100. 555 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1977).
101. 669 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).




Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1957 to provide for the uni-
formity of application among federal circuits that was impossible under
the varied state theories. The statute is still in place today. The federal
circuits, however, have interpreted the running of the three-year period
dissimilarly. One circuit allows recovery only for actions within the three
years preceding the filing of the lawsuit; the other allows recovery for all
actions, provided an infringement occurred within the three years preced-
ing the lawsuit. As a consequence, the goals of uniformity have not been
met.
The first approach is consistent with the goals of statutes of limitations:
to protect against the loss of evidence and provide repose for defendants
and society. The latter option does not. While both approaches, if uni-
formly adopted, could solve the current problems caused by the split of
opinion, only the former can do so in a manner consistent with the goals
of statutes of limitations in general. Therefore, the Supreme Court
should adopt the Second Circuit view as the proper interpretation of the
statute of limitations for civil copyright infringement.
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